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Abstract
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute
it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost
(disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the game, players
may follow selfish strategies to optimize their cost and therefore their behaviors do not
necessarily lead the game to an equilibrium. Even in the case there is an equilibrium,
its makespan might be much larger than the social optimum, and this inefficiency
is measured by the price of anarchy – the worst ratio between the makespan of an
equilibrium and the optimum. Coordination mechanisms aim to reduce the price of
anarchy by designing scheduling policies that specify how jobs assigned to a same
machine are to be scheduled. Typically these policies define the schedule according
to the processing times as announced by the jobs. One could wonder if there are
policies that do not require this knowledge, and still provide a good price of anarchy.
This would make the processing times be private information and avoid the problem
of truthfulness. In this paper we study these so-called non-clairvoyant policies. In
particular, we study the RANDOM policy that schedules the jobs in a random order
without preemption, and the EQUI policy that schedules the jobs in parallel using
time-multiplexing, assigning each job an equal fraction of CPU time.
For these models we study two important questions, the existence of Nash equilibria
and the price of anarchy. We show that the game under RANDOM policy is a potential
game for uniform machines or for two unrelated machines. However, it is not a potential
game for three or more unrelated machines. Moreover, we prove that the game under
the EQUI policy is a potential game.
Next, we analyze the inefficiency of EQUI policy. Interestingly, the (strong) price
of anarchy of EQUI, a non-clairvoyant policy, is asymptotically the same as that of the
best strongly local policy – policies in which a machine may look at the processing time
of jobs assigned to it. The result also indicates that knowledge of jobs’ characteristics
is not necessarily needed.
Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory; Scheduling Games; Coordination Mechanisms;
Nash equilibria.
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1 Introduction
With the development of the Internet, large-scale autonomous systems became more and
more important. The systems consist of many independent and selfish agents who com-
pete for the usage of shared resources. Every configuration has some social cost, as well as
individual costs for every agent. Due to the lack of coordination, the equilibrium configu-
rations may have high cost compared to the global social optimum and this inefficiency can
be captured by the price of anarchy [27]. It is defined as the ratio between the worst case
performance of Nash equilibrium [29] and the global optimum. Since the behavior of the
agents is influenced by the individual costs, it is natural to come up with mechanisms that
both force the existence of Nash equilibria and reduce the price of anarchy. The idea is to
try to reflect the social cost in the individual costs, so that selfish agents’ behaviors result in
a socially desired solution. In particular we are interested in scheduling games, where every
player has to choose one machine on which to execute its job. The individual cost of a player
is the completion time of its job, and the social cost is the largest completion time over all
jobs, the makespan. For these games, so called coordination mechanisms have been studied
by Christodoulou et al. [10]. A coordination mechanism is a set of local policies, one for every
machine, that specify a schedule for the jobs assigned to it, and the schedule can depend
only on these jobs. Most prior studied policies depend on the processing times and need
the jobs to announce their processing times. The jobs could try to influence the schedule
to their advantage by announcing not their correct processing times. There are two ways
to deal with this issue. One is to design truthful coordination mechanisms where jobs have
an incentive to announce their real processing times. Another way is to design mechanisms
that do not depend on the processing times at all and this is the subject of this paper: we
study coordination mechanisms based on so called non-clairvoyant policies that we define in
this section.
1.1 Preliminaries
Scheduling The machine scheduling problem is defined as follows: we are given n jobs,
m machines and each job needs to be scheduled on exactly one machine. In the most
general case machine speeds are unrelated, and for every job 1 ≤ i ≤ n and every machine
1 ≤ j ≤ m we are given an arbitrary processing time pi,,j, which is the time spend by job i
on machine j. A schedule σ is a function mapping each job to some machine. The load of
a machine j in schedule σ is the total processing time of jobs assigned to this machine, i.e.,
`j =
∑
i:σ(i)=j pi,,j. The makespan of a schedule is the maximal load over all machines, and is
the social cost of a schedule. It is NP-hard to compute the global optimum even for identical
machines, that is when pi,,j does not depend on j, see [21, problem SS8]. We denote by OPT
the makespan of the optimal schedule.
Machine environments We consider four different machine environments, which all have
their own justification. The most general environment concerns unrelated machines as de-
fined above and is denoted R||Cmax. In the identical machine scheduling model, denoted
2
P ||Cmax, every job i comes with a length pi such that pi,,j = pi for every machine j. In the
uniform machine scheduling model, denoted Q||Cmax, again every job has length pi and every
machine j a speed sj such that pi,,j = pi/sj. For the restricted identical machine model, ev-
ery job i comes with a length pi and a set of machines Si on which it can be scheduled, such
that pi,,j = pi for j ∈ Si and pi,,j =∞ otherwise. In [7] this model is denoted PMPM ||Cmax,
and in [26] it is denoted B||Cmax.
Scheduling game What we described so far are well known and extensively studied classi-
cal scheduling problems. But now consider the situation where each of the n jobs is owned by
an independent agent. In this paper we will sometimes abuse notation and identify the agent
with his job. The agents do not care about the social optimum, their goal is to complete
their job as soon as possible. We consider the situation where each agent can freely decide
on which machine its job is to be scheduled. The actual schedule however is not decided by
the agents. We rather fix a policy, known to all agents, which specifies the actual schedule,
once all agents assigned their jobs to machines. Different policies are defined below.
In the paper, we concentrate on pure strategies where each agent selects a single machine
to process its job. Such a mapping σ is called a strategy profile. Each agent is aware of the
decisions made by other agents and behaves selfishly. The individual cost of a job is defined
as its completion time. A pure Nash equilibrium is a schedule in which no agent has an
incentive to unilaterally switch to another machine. In this paper we will simply omit the
adjective pure, since there is no confusion possible. A strong Nash equilibrium is a schedule
that is resilient to deviations of any coalition, i.e., no group of agents can cooperate and
change their strategies in such a way that all players in the group strictly decrease their
costs, see [3, 16]. For some given strategy profile, a better response move of a job i is a
strategy (machine) j such that if job i changes to job j, while all other players stick to their
strategy, the cost of i decreases strictly. If there is such a move, we say that this job is
unhappy, otherwise it is happy. In this setting a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile where
all jobs are happy. The better-response dynamic is the process of repeatedly choosing an
arbitrary unhappy job and changing it to an arbitrary better response move. A potential
game is a game in which for any instance, the better-response dynamic always converges [28].
Such a property is typically shown by the use of a potential function, which maps strategy
profiles to non-negative numerical values. The game is called a strong potential game if there
is a potential function with the property that if an agent improves its individual cost by some
amount ∆, then the potential function decreases by the same amount ∆.
A coordination mechanism is a set of scheduling policies, one for each machine, that deter-
mines how to schedule jobs assigned to a machine [10]. The idea is to connect the individual
cost to the social cost, in such a way that the selfishness of the agents will lead to equilibria
that have low social cost. How good is a given coordination mechanism? This is measured
by the well-known price of anarchy (PoA), see [27]. It is defined as the ratio between the cost
of the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost, which is not an equilibrium in general.
We also consider the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) which is the extension of the price of
anarchy applied to strong Nash equilibria [16].
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Figure 1: Different scheduling policies for pA = 1, pB = 1, pC = 2, pD = 3. Tie is broken
arbitrarily between jobs A and B. The rectangles represent the schedules on a single machine
with time going from left to right and the height of a block being the amount of CPU assigned
to the job.
Policies A policy is a rule that specifies how the jobs that are assigned to a machine are
to be scheduled. We now define several policies, and give proper credit to the introducing
papers in section 1.2.
We distinguish between local, strongly local and non-clairvoyant policies. Let Sj be the
set of jobs assigned to machine j. A policy is local if the scheduling of jobs on machine j
depends only on the parameters of jobs in Sj, i.e., it may looks at the processing time pi,k
of a job i ∈ Sj on any machine k. A policy is strongly local if it looks only at the processing
time of jobs in Sj on machine j. We call a policy non-clairvoyant if the scheduling of jobs on
machine j does not depend on the processing time of any job on any machine. In this paper
we only study coordination mechanisms that use the same policy for all machines, as opposed
to Angel et al. [1]. SPT and LPT are policies that schedule the jobs without preemption
respectively in order of increasing or decreasing processing times with a deterministic tie-
breaking rule for each machine. An interesting property of SPT is that it minimizes the sum
of the completion times, while LPT has a better price of anarchy, because it incites small jobs
to go on the least loaded machine which smoothes the loads. A policy that relates individual
costs even stronger to the social cost is MAKESPAN, where jobs are scheduled in parallel on
one machine using time-multiplexing and assigned each job a fraction of the CPU that is
proportional to its processing time. As a result all jobs complete at the same time, and the
individual cost is the load of the machine. All these policies are deterministic, in the sense
that they map strategy profiles to a determined schedule. This is opposed to randomized
policies which map strategy profiles to a distribution of schedules.
What could a scheduler do in the non-clairvoyant case? He could either schedule the jobs
in a random order or in parallel. The RANDOM policy schedules the jobs in a random order
without preemption. Consider a job i assigned to machine j in the schedule σ, then the cost
of i under the RANDOM policy is its expected completion time, i.e.,
ci = pi,j +
1
2
∑
i′:σ(i′)=j, i′ 6=i
pi′,j.
In other words the expected completion time of i is half of the total load of the machine, where
job i counts twice. Again, as for MAKESPAN, the individual and social cost in RANDOM are
strongly related, and it is likely that these policies should have the same price of anarchy.
That is is indeed the case except for unrelated machines.
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Another natural non-clairvoyant policy is EQUI, which has been studied for example
in [13] in the different context of online algorithms. As MAKESPAN it schedules the jobs in
parallel preemptivly using time-multiplexing, but it assigns to every job the same fraction
of the CPU. Suppose there are k jobs with processing times p1,j ≤ p2,j ≤ . . . ≤ pk,j assigned
to machine j, we renumbered jobs from 1 to k for this example. Since, each job receives the
same amount of resource, then job 1 is completed at time c1 = kp1,j. At that time, all jobs
have remaining processing time (p2,j − p1,j) ≤ (p3,j − p1,j) ≤ . . . ≤ (pk,j − p1,j). Now the
machine splits its resource into k− 1 parts until the moment job 2 is completed, which is at
kp1,j + (k− 1)(p2,j − p1,j) = p1,j + (k− 1)p2,j. In general, the completion time of job i, which
is also its cost, under EQUI policy is:
ci = ci−1 + (k − i+ 1)(pi,j − pi−1,j)
= p1,j + . . .+ pi−1,j + (k − i+ 1)pi,j (1)
We already distinguished policies depending on what information is needed from the jobs.
In addition we distinguish between preemptive and non-preemptive policies, depending on
the schedule that is produced. Among the policies we considered so far, only MAKESPAN
and EQUI are preemptive, in the sense that they rely on time-multiplexing, which consists
in executing arbitrary small slices of the jobs. Note that, EQUI is a realistic and quite
popular policy. It is implemented in many operating systems such as Unix and Windows.
See Figure 1 for an illustration of these five policies.
Example For illustration consider the scheduling game on parallel identical machines and
the EQUI policy. Here each of the n jobs has a processing time pi, for 1 ≤ i 6= n. Every
agent selects a machine, which is described by a strategy profile σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m}.
Now the individual cost of agent i, is the completion time of its job, which for this policy is∑
i′
min{pi,j, pi′,j},
where the sum is taken over all jobs i′ assigned to the same machine as i, i.e. σ(i) = σ(i′).
1.2 Previous and related work
Coordination mechanism are related to local search algorithms. The local improvement
moves in the local search algorithm correspond to the better-response moves of players in
the game defined by the coordination mechanism. Some results on local search algorithms
for scheduling problem are surveyed in [33].
Most previous work concerned non-preemptive strongly local policies, in particular the
MAKESPAN policy. Czumaj and Vo¨cking [11] gave tight results Θ(logm/ log logm) of its
price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria on uniform machines. Fiat et al. [15] extended this
result for the strong price of anarchy, and obtained the tight bound Θ(logm/(log logm)2).
In addition, Gairing et al. [20] and Awerbuch et al. [4] gave tight bounds for the price of
anarchy for restricted identical machines.
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Coordination mechanism design was introduced by Christodoulou et al. [10]. They stud-
ied the LPT policy on identical machines. Immorlica et al. [26] studied coordination mecha-
nism for all four machine environments and gave a survey on the results for non-preemptive
strongly local policies. They also analyzed the existence of pure Nash equilibria under SPT,
LPT and RANDOM for certain machine environments and the speed of convergence to equi-
librium of the better response dynamics. Precisely, they proved that the game is a potential
game under the policies SPT on unrelated machines, LPT on uniform or restricted identical
machines, and RANDOM on restricted identical machines. In [32] it was shown that the
game does not converge under the LPT policy on unrelated machines. The policy EQUI has
been studied in [13] for its competitive ratio. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Azar et al. [6] introduced the inefficiency-based local policy which has price of anarchy
O(logm) on unrelated machines. Moreover, they also proved that every non-preemptive
strongly local policy with an additional assumption has price of anarchy at least m/2, which
shows a sharp difference between strongly local and local policies.
model \ policy MAKESPAN SPT LPT RANDOM EQUI
identical 2− 2
m+1
2− 1
m
4
3
− 1
3m
2− 2
m+1
2− 1
m
[17, 31] [23, 26] [24, 10] [17, 31]
uniform Θ( logm
loglogm
) Θ(logm) 1.52 ≤ PoA ≤ 1.59 Θ( logm
loglogm
) Θ(logm)
[11] [2, 26] [12, 19, 26] [11]
restricted id. Θ( logm
loglogm
) Θ(logm) Θ(logm) Θ( logm
loglogm
) Θ(logm)
[20, 4] [2, 26] [5, 26] [20, 4]
unrelated unbounded Θ(m) unbounded Θ(m) Θ(m)
[31] [9, 25, 6] [26]
Table 1: Price of anarchy under different strongly local and non-clairvoyant policies. The
right most column is our contribution.
1.3 Our contribution
We are interested in admissible non-clairvoyant policies – policies that always induce a Nash
equilibrium for any instance of the game. In the game, maybe more important than the
question of existence of Nash equilibrium is the question of convergence to an equilibria. Since
no processing time is known to the coordination mechanism it is impossible to compute some
equilibria or even decide if a given assignment of jobs to machines is an equilibria. Besides,
if all processing times are known to all jobs, it makes sense to let the jobs evolve according
to the better-response dynamics, until they eventually reach an equilibria. Therefore in the
paper, we are interested in the convergence of the better-response dynamic.
In Section 2, we study the existence of Nash equilibrium under the non-clairvoyant policies
RANDOM and EQUI. We show that for the RANDOM policy, the game is a potential game
on uniform machines. We also show that on two unrelated machines, it is a potential game,
but for three unrelated machines or more, the better-response dynamic does not converge.
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Moreover, we prove that for the EQUI policy, the game is a (strong) potential game, see
Table 2.
model \ policy MAKESPAN SPT LPT RANDOM EQUI
identical
Yes
[14]
Yes
[26]
Yes
[26]
Yes [26]
Yes
uniform Yes
restricted id. Yes [26]
unrelated No [32]
Yes for m = 2
No for m ≥ 3
Table 2: Convergence of the better response dynamic.
In Section 3, we analyze the price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy of EQUI.
We observe that RANDOM is slightly better than EQUI except for the unrelated model. In
the unrelated model, interestingly, the price of anarchy of EQUI reaches the lower bound
in [6] on the PoA of any strongly local policy with some additional condition. The latter
shows that although there is a clear difference between strongly local and local policies with
respect to the price of anarchy, our results indicate that in contrast, restricting strongly local
policies to be non-clairvoyant does not really affect the price of anarchy. Moreover, EQUI
policy does not need any knowledge about jobs’ characteristics, even their identities (IDs)
which are useful in designing policies with low price of anarchy in [6, 8].
2 Existence of Nash equilibrium
The results in this section are summarized as follows.
Summary of results on the existence of Nash equilibrium: We consider the schedul-
ing game under different policies in different machine environments.
1. For the RANDOM policy on uniform machines, it is a potential game. For the RAN-
DOM policy on unrelated machines, it is not a potential game for 3 or more machines,
but it is a potential game for 2 machines.
2. For the EQUI policy it is an exact potential game.
2.1 The RANDOM policy on uniform machines
In the RANDOM policy, the cost of a job is its expected completion time. If the load of
machine j is `j then the cost of job i assigned to machine j is
1
2
(`j +pi,j). Observe that a job
i on machine j has an incentive to move to machine j′ if and only if pi,j + `j > 2pi,j′ + `j′ .
In this section, we consider uniform machines. Let p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn be the job lengths
and s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm be the machine speeds. Now the processing time of job i on machine
j is pi/sj.
7
Theorem 1 The scheduling game on uniform machines and the RANDOM policy is a po-
tential game.
Proof: Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} be a strategy profile. The proof will use a potential
function adapted from previous studies on congestion games [30] and load balancing games
[22, 18]. We define
Φ(σ) :=
m∑
j=1
`2j
sj
+ 3
n∑
i=1
p2i
sσ(i)
,
where `j is the load of machine j, i.e. the sum of pi over all jobs i with σ(i) = j.
Now consider a job i that makes a better response move from machine a to machine b.
If `a, `b denote the loads respectively of machine a and b before the move, then by definition
of a better response move we have the inequality
`a + pi
sa
>
`b + 2pi
sb
. (2)
Let σ′ be the profile after the move of job j. The change in the potential is
Φ(σ′)− Φ(σ) = (`b + pi)
2
sb
+
(`a − pi)2
sa
+
3p2i
sb
− `
2
a
sa
− `
2
b
sb
− 3p
2
i
sa
=
`2b + 2`bpi + p
2
i + 3p
2
i − `2b
sb
+
`2a − 2`api + p2i − `2a − 3p2i
sa
= 2pi
(
`b + 2pi
sb
− `a + pi
sa
)
< 0
due to (2). Therefore, the potential function Φ strictly decreases at every better response
move. 
2.2 The RANDOM policy for unrelated machines
In the following, we will characterize the game under the RANDOM policy in the unrelated
model as a function of the number of machines.
Theorem 2 The scheduling game on 2 unrelated machines with the RANDOM is a potential
game.
Proof: Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, 2} be the current strategy profile, meaning that job i is
assigned to machine σ(i). By σ(i) we denote the opposite machine to machine σ(i). Let `j
be the load of machine j in strategy profile σ, which is
∑
i:σ(i)=j pi,j. Define the potential
function as
Φ(σ) := (`1 − `2)2 + 3
n∑
i=1
p2i,σ(i).
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We claim that the potential function Φ strictly decreases at every better response move.
Let i be a job moving from say machine a to machine b, while strictly decreasing its cost,
i.e.
`b + 2pi,b − `a − pi,a < 0, (3)
where `a, `b are the loads before the move.
Let σ′ be the strategy profile after the move of job i. We have:
Φ(σ′)− Φ(σ) = (`a − pi,a − `b − pi,b)2 − (`a − `b)2 + 3(p2i,b − p2i,a)
= −(pi,a + pi,b)(2`a − pi,a − 2`b − pi,b) + 3(pi,a + pi,b)(pi,a − pi,b)
= (pi,a + pi,b)[3(pi,b − pi,a)− (2`a − pi,a − 2`b − pi,b)]
= 2(pi,a + pi,b)[(2pi,b + `b)− (pi,a + `a)] < 0
due to (3). Therefore, the potential function Φ strictly decreases at every better response
move. 
However, for 3 or more machines, the better-response dynamic does not necessarily con-
verge.
Lemma 1 The better-response dynamic does not converge under the RANDOM policy on 3
or more unrelated machines.
Proof: We give a simple four-job instance, with the following processing times. For conve-
nience we name the jobs A,B,C,D.
pi,j 1 2 3
A 90 84 ∞
B 96 2 ∞
C 138 100 ∞
D ∞ 254 300
Now we describe a cyclic sequence of better response moves, where each job strictly decreases
its cost, showing that the game does not converge. In the following table, we describe in
each line, the current strategy profile, a better response move of an unhappy job and its
cost improvement. For example the first line shows the strategy profile, where jobs A,B are
on machine 1, C is on machine 2 and D on machine 3. Then job the cost of job A is 138
and moving to machine 2, its cost drops to 134. The subsequent line show similar better
9
response moves, which end in the initial strategy profile.
1 2 3 move cost improvement
AB C D 1
A→ 2 138 > 134
B AC D 1
B→ 2 96 > 94
ABC D 2
C→ 1 143 > 138
C AB D 3
D→ 2 300 > 297
C ABD 2
B→ 1 171 > 165
BC AD 2
A→ 1 211 > 207
ABC D 1
C→ 2 231 > 227
AB CD 2
D→ 3 304 > 300
AB C D

Note that although there exists a cycle in better-reponse dynamic of the game under
RANDOM policy, this does not mean that the game possesses no equilibrium, see [28].
2.3 The EQUI policy
In the EQUI policy, the cost of job i assigned to machine j is given by expression (1). Here
is an alternative formulation for the cost
ci =
∑
i′:σ(i′)=j
pi′,j≤pi,j
pi′,j +
∑
i′:σ(i′)=j
pi′,j>pi,j
pi,j
Lemma 2 The game with the EQUI policy is an exact potential game.
Proof: If in a game every better response move would strictly decrease the total load, the
game would converge. Unfortunately the game does not have this property. Also, if a better
response move would never increase the individual costs of players, again the game would
converge, since the total individual costs would measure convergence. It happens that the
game does not have this property either. It turns out that a measure for the convergence
is in fact an average of two measures above: the sum over all individual costs and the total
load over all machines.
Let σ be the current strategy profile, meaning σ(i) is the current machine on which job
i is scheduled. Consider the following potential function.
Φ(σ) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(
ci + pi,σ(i)
)
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We prove that if a job makes a better response move then the potential function strictly
decreases. Let t be a job that moves from machine a to b, while stricly decreasing its cost
from ct to c
′
t. We have
ct =
 ∑
i:σ(i)=a,i6=t
pi,a≤pt,a
pi,a +
∑
i:σ(i)=a,i6=t
pi,a>pt,a
pt,a
+ pt,a
>
 ∑
i:σ(i)=b,i 6=t
pi,b≤pt,b
pi,b +
∑
i:σ(i)=b,i 6=t
pi,b>pt,b
pt,b
+ pt,b
= c′t.
Let σ′ be the strategy profile after the move of job t. Note that in σ′ the processing time of
all jobs except i and the cost of all jobs scheduled on machine different to a and b stay the
same. Thus, the change in the potential depends only on the jobs scheduled on machines a
and b.
2 ·∆Φ =
 ∑
i:σ′(i)=a
(c′i + pi,a) +
∑
i:σ′(i)=b,i 6=t
(c′i + pi,b) + pt,b

−
 ∑
i:σ(i)=a,i6=t
(ci + pi,a) +
∑
i:σ(i)=b
(ci + pi,b) + pt,a
+ (c′t − ct)
=
∑
i:σ(i)=a,i6=t
(c′i − ci) +
∑
i:σ(i)=b,i 6=t
(c′i − ci) + (c′t − ct) + pt,b − pt,a
since σ(i) = σ′(i) ∀i 6= t.
Consider a job i 6= t on machine a. If the processing time of i is at most that of t then
the difference between its new and old cost is exactly −pi,a. Otherwise if the processing time
of i is strictly greater than that of t then this difference is exactly −pt,a. Analogously for
jobs on machine b. Hence,
2 ·∆Φ =
 ∑
i:σ(i)=b,i 6=t
pi,b≤pt,b
pi,b +
∑
i:σ(i)=b,i 6=t
pi,b>pt,b
pt,b + pt,b
+
+
 ∑
i:σ(i)=a,i6=t
pi,a≤pt,a
−pi,a +
∑
i:σ(i)=a,i6=t
pi,a>pt,a
−pt,a − pt,a
+ (c′t − ct)
= 2 · (c′t − ct) < 0
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Therefore, the game with the EQUI policy is an exact potential game. 
Now we strengthen the statement of the previous lemma.
Theorem 3 The game with the EQUI policy is a strong potential game, in the sense that
the better-response dynamic converges even with deviations of coalitions.
Proof: Let S be a coalition and define its total cost c(S) :=
∑
i∈S ci. We study a better
response move of S by dividing the process into two phases: in the first phase, all jobs in
S move out (disappear) from the game and in the second phase, jobs from S move back
(appear) into the game at their new strategies. We argue that after the first phase, the
change in the potential is ∆Φ = −c(S) and after the second phase ∆Φ = c′(S). Since the
argument is the same, we only prove it for the first phase; the second phase can be done
similarly. Fix a machine a and suppose without loss of generality that all the jobs assigned
to a are 1, . . . , k for some k. Also to simplify notation we denote qi = pi,a and assume
q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qk. Let R = S ∩ σ−1(j) = {i1 ≤ . . . ≤ ir} be the set of jobs in the coalition that
are scheduled on this machine. Then,
c(R) =
r∑
j=1
cij =
r∑
j=1
(
q1 + q2 + . . .+ qij−1 + (k − ij + 1)qij
)
The jobs in R partition the jobs {1, . . . , k} into r + 1 parts: part j ∈ {0, . . . , r} is
[ij + 1, jj+1], where for convenience we denote i0 = 0 and ir+1 = k. After the move out of
R, the change in cost of a job t /∈ R scheduled on the machine with index in [ij + 1, ij+1] is
qi1 + qi2 + . . .+ qij−1 + (r− j)qt. Hence, the difference in the potential restricted to machine
a after the first phase ∆Φ|a satisfies:
−2∆Φ|a =
 r∑
j=0
∑
t/∈R
t∈[ij+1,ij+1]
qi1 + qi2 + . . .+ qij−1 + (r − j)qt

+ [c(R) + (qi1 + qi2 + . . .+ qir)]
=
 r∑
j=1
(k − ij)qij +
r∑
j=0
∑
t/∈R
t∈[ij+1,ij+1]
(r − j)qt

+ [c(R) + (qi1 + qi2 + . . .+ qir)]
=
r∑
j=1
(
q1 + q2 + . . .+ qij−1 + (k − ij + 1)qij
)
+ c(R)
= 2 · c(R)
where in the first term of these equalities, we distinguish between the cost change of all jobs
not in the coalition and the cost change of the jobs in the coalition, disapearing from the
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game. The potential change after the first phase is simply the sum of all the changes over
all machines, so ∆Φ = −c(S).
By the same argument, after the second phase we have ∆Φ = c′(S). Therefore, the net
change over both phases is c′(S)− c(S). In conclusion, the game is a strong potential game.

3 Inefficiency of Equilibria under the EQUI policy
In this section, we study the inefficiency of the game under the EQUI policy which is captured
by the price of anarchy (PoA) and the strong price of anarchy (SPoA). Note that the set
of strong Nash equilibria is a subset of that of Nash equilibria so the SPoA is at most as
large as the PoA. We state the main theorem of this section. Whenever we bound (S)PoA
we mean that the bound applies to both the price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy.
Summary of results on the price of anarchy: The game under the EQUI policy has
the following inefficiency.
1. For identical machines, the (S)PoA is 2− 1
m
.
2. For uniform machines, the (S)PoA is Θ(min{logm, r}) where r is the number of dif-
ferent machine’s speeds in the model.
3. For restricted identical machines, the (S)PoA is Θ(logm).
4. For unrelated machines, the (S)PoA is Θ(m).
We first give a characterization for strong Nash equilibrium in the game, which connects
the equilibria to the strong ones. This characterization is useful in settling tight bounds of
the strong price of anarchy in the game.
Lemma 3 Suppose in a Nash equilibrium there is a coalition T that makes a collective move
such that each job in T improves strictly its cost. Then this move preserves the number of
jobs on every machine.
Proof: For a proof by contradiction, let η be an equilibrium that is not strong, and let T be
a coalition as stated in the claim. Suppose that the number of jobs on the machines is not
preserved by the move of T . Let j be a machine that has strictly more jobs after the move,
and among all jobs migrating to j, let o ∈ T be the job with smallest length po. Let k and k′
be the numbers of jobs on j before and after the move of T , respectively (k′ > k). We claim
that job o could already improve its cost by unilaterally moving to j, contradicting that η is
a Nash equilibrium. Consider equilibrium η, if o moves to machine j, its cost would be:
co = (k + 1− w)po,j +
∑
i:pi,j<po,j
pi,j
= (k − w + 1)po,j +
∑
i:pi,j<po,j ,i/∈T
pi,j +
∑
i:pi,j<po,j ,i∈T
pi,j
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where w is the number of jobs on machine j in η with length strictly less than po,j.
Let w′ be the number of jobs on machine j after the move of T with length strictly less
than po,j. Since o has the smallest length among all jobs migrating to j, w
′ ≤ w. The cost
of o after the move of T is:
c′o = (k
′ − w′)po,j +
∑
i:pi,j<po,j ,i/∈T
pi,j
We have:
c′o − co = [(k′ − w′)− (k − w + 1)] pi,j −
∑
i:pi,j<po,j ,i∈T
pi,j
≥ (w − w′)pi,j −
∑
i:pi,j<po,j ,i∈T
pi,j
≥ (w − w′)pi,j − (w − w′)pi,j = 0
where the first inequality follows from k′ ≥ k + 1 and the second inequality uses |{i : pi,j <
po,j, i ∈ T}| = w−w′. Since job o has incentive to cooperate and move to machine j, o also
get better off by unilaterally changing its strategy, so η is not an equilibrium. 
3.1 Identical machines
In case of identical machines, the analysis of the PoA is quite similar to the well-known
analysis of Graham’s greedy load balancing algorithm that assigns the jobs to the least load
machine, processing jobs in arbitrary order, see [23]. Here we show that the (S)PoA matches
exactly the approximation factor of the greedy algorithm.
Proposition 1 For identical machines, the (S)PoA is 2− 1
m
. Moreover, there is an instance
in which all equilibria have cost at least (2− 2
m
)OPT .
Proof: (Upper bound) First we prove that PoA is upper-bounded by 2 − 1/m. Let σ be
an equilibrium and `max be the makespan of this equilibrium. Let i be a job (with processing
time pi) that has cost `max. Hence, pi ≤ OPT . Since σ is an equilibrium, the fact that job
i has no incentive to move to any other machine j implies `max ≤ `j + pi for all machines
j different to σ(i), where `j is the load of machine j. Summing up these inequalities over
all machines j we get m`max ≤
∑m
j=1 `j + (m − 1)pi. Moreover, for any assignment of
jobs to identical machines,
∑m
j=1 `j ≤ mOPT . Therefore, m`max ≤ (2m − 1)OPT , i.e.,
PoA ≤ 2− 1/m.
(Lower bound) Now we give an instance in which OPT equals m and all equilibria
have cost at least 2m− 2. In the instance, there are m machines and m(m− 1) + 1 jobs in
which all jobs have processing time 1 except one with processing time m. In an optimum
assignment, the big job is scheduled on one machine and all m(m− 1) unit jobs are evenly
assigned to the other machines, producing makespan m. We claim that in any equilibrium,
every machine has at least (m−1) unit jobs. Suppose there is a machine with at most m−2
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jobs. Since there are m(m− 1) jobs of unit processing time, there must be a machine j with
at least m unit jobs in the equilibrium. A unit job on machine j has cost at least m and
it has incentive to move to the machine with less than m − 2 jobs and get a smaller cost
(at most m− 1). This gives a contradiction and shows that any equilibrium, every machine
has at least m − 1 unit jobs. Now consider the machine with the big job. In addition this
machine has at least m − 2 unit jobs, so its load is at least m + (m − 2). Therefore, the
makespan of the equilibrium is at least (2− 2/m)OPT .
Consider the schedule in which there are (m − 1) unit jobs on every machine and the
job with processing time m on some arbitrary machine. It is straightforward that this is an
equilibrium. By Lemma 3, this equilibrium is also a strong one. Hence, (S)PoA ≥ 2− 1/m.

3.2 Uniform machines
For uniform machines, an upper bound O(logm) on the PoA of any deterministic policy in
this machine environment is proved by Immorlica et al. [26]. In this section, we investigate
the lower bound and show that the bound O(logm) is essentially tight.
In the following, we present a family of game instances in which the PoA, together with
the SPoA, are Ω(logm). The instances are inspired by the ones proving the lower bound of
the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm for uniform machine in [2].
Family of Game Instances There are k + 1 groups of machines G0, G1, . . . , Gk, each
machine in group Gj has speed 2
−j for 0 ≤ j ≤ k. Group G0 has m0 = 1 machine, group Gj
has mj machines which is recursively defined as mj =
∑j−1
t=0 mt · 2j−t. Moreover, there are
k + 1 groups of jobs J0, J1, . . . , Jk, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 each group Jj consists of 2mj jobs of
length 2−j and group Jk consists of 3mk jobs of length 2−k. The total number of machines
is m =
∑k
j=0mj = 1 +
2
3
(4k − 1) + 2 · 4k−1, thus k = Ω(logm). See Figure 2 for illustration.
Consider a schedule that is a two-to-one mapping from the job group Jj to the machine
group Gj, for every j < k, and that is a three-to-one mapping from job group Jk to machine
group Gk. The load on a machine in group Gj for j < k is 2 and each machine in Gk has
load 3. Hence, OPT ≤ 3.
2
J3 J1J2
G0
1 2 3 4
J3 J2
0 1 2 3
J3
0 1 2
J1
J0
G3
1 2
G2
J2
34
J0
5
J1 J2 J3
J3
00
0 1 2 0 1
G1
0 1 2 0 1 2 3
Figure 2: Illustration of the schedule with makespan 3 (upper part) and the strategy profile
σ (lower part) in the game instance for k = 3. Each machine group is represented by one of
its machines.
Consider a schedule (strategy profile) σ such that for every 0 ≤ j ≤ k, in each machine
of group Gj (with speed 2
−j), there are 2 jobs of length 2−j, and for every j < i ≤ k,
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there are 2i−j jobs of length 2−i. Each machine in group Gj has 2k−j+1 jobs and has load
2 · 2−j/2−j +∑k−jt=1 2t · 2−(j+t)/2−j = k− j + 2, so the makespan of this schedule is k+ 2. We
claim that this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, moreover it is a strong one.
Lemma 4 The strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: First, we show that, in strategy profile σ, the cost of a job in Jj is equal to k− j + 2.
Fix a machine in Gt. We are only interested in case t ≤ j since in σ, no job in Jj is assigned
to a machine of group Gt with t > j. On this machine, there are exactly 2
j−t+1 jobs with
processing time at least 2−j. So, the cost of a job in Jj scheduled on this machine is:
1
2−t
[(
2k−t · 2−k + 2(k−1)−t · 2−(k−1) + . . .+ 2(j+1)−t · 2−(j+1))+ 2j−t+1 · 2−j]
= k + 2− j.
Now we argue that σ is an equilibrium. Suppose that a job i in Jj moves from its
current machine to a machine of group Gt. If j ≤ t, i has the greatest length among all jobs
assigned to this new machine, so the new cost of i is the new load of the machine which is
(k − t + 2) + 2−j/2−t > k − j + 2. If j > t then there are (2j−t+1 + 1) jobs with length at
least 2−j on i’s new machine. Hence, the new cost of i is:
1
2−t
[(
2k−t · 2−k + 2(k−1)−t · 2−(k−1) + . . .+ 2(j+1)−t · 2−(j+1))+ (2j−t+1 + 1) · 2−j]
> k + 2− j.
Therefore, no job can improve its cost by changing its strategy. 
Using Lemma 3, we show that σ is indeed a strong equilibrium.
Lemma 5 Strategy profile σ is a strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose σ is not a strong Nash equilibrium, then there exists a coalition T such that
all jobs in T strictly decrease their costs and after the move of T , all machines have the same
number of jobs as in σ (by Lemma 3). Observe that the cost of a job in Jk (with the least
length among all jobs in the instance) depends only on the number of jobs scheduled on its
machine. With such a move of T , if there are some jobs in Jk involved in the coalition, none
of them can strictly decrease its cost. Hence, T ∩ Jk = ∅. Consider jobs in Jk−1. Since jobs
in Jk stay in their machines and they incur the same load 1 on each machine, the cost of a
job in Jk−1, if it involves in T , depends only on the number of jobs which are not in Jk and
are scheduled on its new machine. However, this number is preserved after the move of T
(by Lemma 3 and T ∩ Jk = ∅), so the cost of a job in Jk−1 stays the same, i.e., the job has
no incentive to involve in T . The argument holds for groups of jobs Jk−2, . . . , J0. Therefore,
T = ∅ meaning that σ is a strong equilibrium. 
The previous lemmas imply that for uniform machines, the PoA of EQUI is Ω(logm).
Theorem 4 For uniform machines, the (S)PoA of EQUI is Θ(logm).
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3.3 Restricted Identical Machines
The upper bound of the price of anarchy of EQUI on restricted identical machines follows
immediately by Immorlica et al. [26]. In [26], an instance was given which shows that any
deterministic non-preemptive coordination mechanism has PoA Ω(logm). However, EQUI is
a preemptive policy, and the instance cannot be adapted. In this section, we show that the
price of anarchy of the EQUI policy on restricted identical machines is also Ω(logm) using
another instance.
Theorem 5 For restricted identical machines, the (S)PoA is Θ(logm).
Proof: The upper bound follows from [26]. We show now the lower bound. We adapt a game
instance from the proof of Lemma 5. Let (mj)
k
j=0 be a sequence defined as m0 = 1,m1 = 2
and mj = m0 + . . .+mj−1, i.e., mj = 3 · 2j−2 for every j ≥ 2. Let m =
∑k
j=0mj = 3 · 2k−1.
Hence k = Ω(logm).
In the instance, there are m machines which are divided into k + 1 groups G0, . . . , Gk
where group Gj consists of mj machines. There are also k+1 job groups J0, J1, . . . , Jk where
group Jj contains 3 · 2jmj jobs of processing time 2−j.
We first describe a schedule µ which will be proved to be a Nash equilibrium. On each
machine in group Gj for 0 ≤ j ≤ k, there are 2j+1 jobs of length 2−j and for every j < i ≤ k,
there are 2i jobs of length 2−i. The strategy set of each job is the following. Jobs in group Jj
can be scheduled on all mj machines of group Gj. Moreover, a job in Jj can be additionally
scheduled on its current machine in µ.
We claim that µ is a equilibrium. Observe that on each machine of group Gj, there are
exactly 2i+1 jobs of processing time at least 2−i for all j ≤ i ≤ k and the total load of jobs
with processing time strictly smaller than 2−i (on the machine) is k − i. Thus, the cost of
each job in group Ji is k − i + 2 in µ and if a job switches the strategy, its cost would be
strictly greater than k− j + 2. In addition, using Lemma 3 and by the same argument as in
Lemma 5, we have that this equilibrium is indeed a strong one.
If we schedule evenly all jobs of group Jj on mj machines of Gj for 0 ≤ j ≤ k then the
makespan is bounded by 3, so OPT ≤ 3. The makespan of the strong equilibrium above is
k + 1, which gives the (S)PoA is at least (k + 1)/3 = Ω(logm). 
3.4 Unrelated Machines
In this section, we prove that the PoA of the game under the EQUI policy is upper bounded
by 2m. Interestingly, without any knowledge of jobs’ characteristics, the inefficiency of EQUI
– a non-clairvoyant policy – is the same up to a constant compared to that of SPT – the
best strongly local policy with price of anarchy Θ(m).
Theorem 6 For unrelated machines, the price of anarchy of policy EQUI is at most 2m.
Proof: For job i, let qi be the smallest processing time of i among all machines, i.e., qi :=
minj pi,j and let Q(i) be the machine j minimizing pi,j. Without loss of generality we assume
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that jobs are indexed such that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qn. Note that
∑n
i=1 qi ≤ m · OPT , where
OPT is the optimal makespan, as usual. First, we claim the following lemma.
We claim that In any Nash equilibrium, the cost ci of job i is at most
2q1 + . . .+ 2qi−1 + (n− i+ 1)qi. (4)
The theorem would follow from the claim by the following argument. Since the expression
(4) is increasing in i and at i = n this term is 2
∑n
i=1 qi ≤ 2m ·OPT , the cost of each job in
an equilibrium is bounded by 2m ·OPT , so the price of anarchy is at most 2m.
The proof of the claim is by induction on i. The cost of job 1 on machine Q(1) would be
at most nq1, simply because there are at most n jobs on this machine. Therefore the cost of
job 1 in the Nash equilibrium is also at most nq1. Assume the induction hypothesis holds
until index i− 1. Consider job i. Since the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, i’s current
cost is at most its cost if moving to machine Q(i). We distinguish different cases. In these
cases, denote c′i as the new cost of i if it moves to machine Q(i)
1. Case all jobs t scheduled on machine Q(i) satisfy t > i.
This case is very similar to the basis case. There are at most n − i jobs on machine
Q(i), beside i. The completion time of job i is then at most (n − i + 1)qi which is
upper bounded by (4). For the remaining cases, we assume that there is a job i′ < i
scheduled on Q(i).
2. Case there is a job t < i on machine Q(i) such that pt,Q(i) ≥ pi,Q(i)(= qi).
Since pt,Q(i) ≥ qi, the new cost of job i is not more than the new cost of job t. Moreover,
the new cost of job t is increased by exactly qi, so the new cost of i is bounded by
c′i ≤ ct + qi
≤ 2q1 + . . .+ 2qt−1 + (n− t+ 1)qt + qi
= 2q1 + . . .+ 2qt−1 + 2(i− t)qt + (n− 2i+ t+ 1)qt + qi
≤ 2q1 + . . .+ 2qt−1 + 2qt + . . .+ 2qi−1 + (n− i+ 1)qi,
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis and the last inequality is due
to t < i and qt ≤ qt+1 ≤ . . . ≤ qi.
3. Case every job t scheduled on machine Q(i) with pt,Q(i) ≥ qi satisfies t ≥ i.
Since we are not in the first two cases, there is a job t < i on machine Q(i) with
pt,Q(i) < qi. Let i
′ be the job of greatest index among all jobs scheduled on Q(i)
with smaller processing time than qi. All jobs t scheduled on Q(i) and having smaller
processing time than that of i, also have smaller index because qt ≤ pt,Q(i) ≤ qi.
Therefore i′ is precisely the last job to complete before i. At the completion time of i′
there are still qi− pi′,Q(i) ≤ qi− qi′ units of i to be processed. By the case assumption,
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there are at most (n − i) jobs with processing time greater than that of i. Therefore
the new cost of i is at most
c′i = ci′ + (n− i+ 1)(qi − qi′)
≤ 2q1 + . . .+ 2qi′−1 + (n− i′ + 1)qi′ + (n− i+ 1)(qi − qi′)
= 2q1 + . . .+ 2qi′−1 + (i− i′)qi′ + (n− i+ 1)qi
≤ 2q1 + . . .+ 2qi′−1 + (qi′ + . . .+ qi−1) + (n− i+ 1)qi
≤ 2q1 + . . .+ 2qi−1 + (n− i+ 1)qi
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis and the third inequality is due
to the monotonicity of the sequence (qj)
n
j=1.
This completes the proof of the claim, and therefore of the theorem. 
We provide a game instance showing that the upper bound analyzed above is tight. The
instance is inspired by the work of Azar et al. [6]. In the following lemma, we prove the
lower bound of the PoA of the game under the EQUI policy.
Lemma 6 The (strong) price of anarchy of EQUI is at least (m+ 1)/4.
Proof: Let nj :=
2(m−1)!
(j−1)! and n :=
∑m
j=1 nj. Consider the set of m machines and m groups
of jobs J1, J2, . . . , Jm. In group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1), there are nj jobs that can be scheduled
on machine j or j + 1 except the last group (Jm) which has a single job that can be only
scheduled on machine m. Each job in group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) has processing time
pj,j =
(j−1)!
(m−1)! =
2
nj
on machine j and has processing time pj,j+1 =
j!
2(m−1)! =
1
nj+1
on machine
j + 1. The job in Jm has processing time pm,m = 1 on machine m.
Consider the strategy profile in which half of the jobs in Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) are
scheduled on machine j and the other half are scheduled on machine j + 1 (jobs in Jm
are scheduled on machine m). We claim that this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that the cost of jobs in the same group and scheduled on the same machine are the
same. The cost of each job in group Jj on machine j is the load of the machine, because
its processing time is greater than that of jobs in group Jj−1 on machine m, and this load
equals
nj−1
2
pj−1,j +
nj
2
pj,j =
j−1
2
+ 1 = j+1
2
. Each job in group Jj has smaller processing
time than that of each job in group Jj+1 on machine j + 1, thus the cost of the former is
nj+nj+1
2
pj,j+1 =
j+1
2
. Hence, no job in group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) has an incentive to move
and the job in group Jm cannot switch its strategy. Therefore, the strategy profile is an
equilibrium.
Moreover, we prove that this equilibrium is indeed a strong one. Suppose that it is not
a strong equilibrium, i.e., there is a coalition S such that all jobs in S can strictly decrease
their cost. Again, by Lemma 3, the number of jobs on each machine remains the same after
the move of S. We call a job in group Jj moving up if it moves from machine j to j + 1
and moving down if it moves from machine j + 1 to j. First, we claim that no job has an
incentive to move up. If a job in group Jj moves up, as only jobs in Jj and Jj+1 can use
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machine j + 1 and pj,j+1 < pj+1,j+1, its new cost would be pj,j+1 · (nj + nj+1) which equals
its old cost. Hence, no one can strictly decrease its cost by moving up. Among all jobs in S,
consider the one who moves down to the machine j∗ of smallest index. By the choice of j∗,
there is no job moving down from machine j∗ and as claimed above, no job moving up from
j∗. Hence, the job moving to machine j∗ cannot strictly decrease its cost – that contradicts
to the assumption that all jobs in S strictly get better off. Therefore, the equilibrium is a
strong one.
Consider a schedule in which jobs in group Jj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) are assigned to machine j
and this schedule has makespan 2, hence OPT ≤ 2. The makespan of the above (strong)
Nash equilibrium is the load on machine m, that is equal to (m + 1)/2. Then, the (strong)
price of anarchy is at least (m+ 1)/4. 
4 Conclusion and Open questions
In this paper, we studied coordination mechanisms under non-clairvoyant policies. We first
studied whether some policies are admissible – which is the first property that we expect
from a policy. We studied in detail the existence of Nash equilibrium under the RANDOM
and the EQUI policies. Next, we analyzed the inefficiency (PoA) of the EQUI policy and
showed that the knowledge of the agents processing times is not really necessary, since EQUI
behaves nearly as good as the best known strongly local policy SPT. One more advantage is
that there is no need to implement EQUI policy (if using it) since this popular policy exists
in many operating systems.
An interesting open question is to answer (prove or disprove) whether the gap of the
PoA between strongly local and local policies can be closed. Does there exist a (preemptive,
randomized) strongly local policies with the PoA poly-logarithmic on m? Azar et al. [6]
proved that with an additional condition, this gap is closed. Can we bypass this condition?
Besides, does there exist a truthful coordination mechanism based on strongly local policy
with PoA as o(m) ?
Another interesting open problem is the speed of convergence to approximate a Nash
equilibrium for RANDOM and EQUI in the machines environment where equilibrium is guar-
anteed to exist.
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